FEDERAL RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
24(a)(2) AND THE "INTEREST" NECESSARY
FOR INTERVENTION AS OF RIGHT ON
APPEAL
In Smuck v. Hobson' the Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia Circuit held that parents of school children were entitled
to intervene as of right under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
24(a)(2) to appeal a district court's school desegregation order
which the parents contended limited the local school board's
discretion even though the school board did not appeal. The
original action was brought on behalf of Negro and poor children
against the school board for unconstitutionally denying members of
their class equal educational opportunities.*-' In order to eliminate
racial and economic status discrimination, the district court issued
specific orders requiring the school board to eliminate optional
zones in which students could choose which of two schools they
wished to attend; to provide transportation for volunteering
students from overcrowded schools to those with excess capacity;
and immediately provide for substantial faculty integration. The
district court also issued a general injunction against racial or
economic discrimination by the school board; required it to submit
a long-range plan of pupil assignment designed to alleviate racial
imbalance; and ordered termination of the "track system," an
allegedly discriminatory method of grouping students of
comparable scholastic ability.? The school board voted six to two
to accept the district court ruling and indicated compliance. The
Superintendent of Schools, a named defendant in the original
action,' resigned his position but, nevertheless, appealed.
Presumably recognizing that his right to appeal as a named
defendant was lost when he resigned his official position, the
Superintendent, along with one of the dissenting school board
members and parents of certain school children, sought to intervene
1408 F.2d 175 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
2 Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401 (D.D.C. 1967), appeal dhnisnhd 393 U.S. 801
(1968).
Id. at 517-18.

Id. at 401.
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under rule 24(a)(2) to appeal the district court's order on the
ground that it was unreasonably restrictive of the school board's
discretion. After a hearing at the request of the court of appeals,
the district court reluctantly granted intervention as of right to all
three applicants solely for the purpose of setting the stage for a test
of this right at the appellate level 5 The court of appeals reversed
with regard to the former superintendent, holding that he had no
standing to appeal after he left his official position and did not
have the necessary interest to intervene since a decision on the
appeal would have no effect on him individually. The dissenting
member of the school board was similarly denied the right to
intervene because his official interest was limited to his right to
participate in school board decisions, and he also was without an
individual interest. The parents were held to have an interest
sufficient for intervention under 24(a)(2) for the limited purpose of
challenging those portions of the district court order which did in
fact limit the school board's discretion. Because the orders
enjoining discrimination and requiring the formulation of the long
range pupil assignment plan merely declared constitutional
requirements and because the order to abolish the "track system"
left the board free to devise a more equitable system of ability
grouping, the parents were found to have no interest to permit
intervention as to these orders since they did not impair the board's
discretion. Conversely, the court found that the orders requiring
bussing of volunteering students, faculty integration, and
elimination of optional zones did limit the board's discretion in
areas of immediate concern to the parents and their children, and
intervention to appeal them was granted. The appeal, however, was
denied on the merits, the court of appeals holding that the orders
limiting the board's discretion were constitutionally required in
order to correct segregative practices in the school system. The
decree was thus left unaltered by appeal, but the case was remanded
to allow the district court to insure the newly elected school board
full freedom in implementing the decree.
The present version of rule 24(a) is the product of a 1966
revision which broadened the right of intervention by combining the
: Hobson v. Hansen. 44 F.R.D. IS (D.D.C. 1968). noted in 17 CATHOLIC U.L. Ralv. 495

(1968).
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basic ideas of former subsections (2) and (3).6 Old subsection (3)
provided for the intervention of individuals who might be adversely
affected by a court's disposition of property,7 but that type of

intervention was infrequently granted unless the applicant claimed
an interest in a fund under court control.3 lihtervention under

former subsection (2), which required that an applicant be
"bound" by judgment in the action as well as inadequately
represented by existing parties,9 .was made similarly unavailable to
most prospective intervenors when the Supreme Court held that the
applicant must show that judgment in the main action would later
subject him to a plea of res judicata. 0 Discarding any requirement
that an applicant claim ownership of a fund or that he be bound by

res judicata, t present rule 24(a)(2) requires that an individual be
permitted to intervene
when the applicant claims an interest relating to the property or
transaction which is the subject of the action and he is so situated
that the disposition of the action may as a practical matter impair
or impede his ability to protect that interest, unless the applicant's
interest is adequately represented by existing parties.'Shortly after the effective date of the new rule, the Supreme Court
13
in Cascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.
granted intervention as of right to a purchaser of natural gas on the
NF'D. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2); Rule 24(a)(1), unchanged by the 1966 amendment, provides
for intervention "when a statute of the United States provides an unconditional right to intervene."
7 FED. R. Cv. P. 24(a)(3), 329 U.S. 853 (1946).
.See Allen Calculators. Inc. v. Nat'l Cash Register Co., 322 U.S. 137 (1944): United
States v. ASCAP. 202 F. Supp. 340 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). But see Formulabs. Inc. v. Hartley
Pen Co.. 275 F.2d 52 (9th Cir.). cert. denied. 363 U.S. 830 (1960). See generally 2 W.
BARRON & A. ItOLTZOPiF. FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 598 (Wright ed. 1961): 4 J.
MOORE. FF'tDERAt. PRACTICE 4 24.09 (2d ed. 1968).
'FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2), 329 U.S. 853 (1946).
' Sam Fox Publishing Co. v. United States. 366 U.S. 683, 690-93 (1961). See generally
Comment. Interrention of Right in Class Actions: The Dilemma oJ Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 24(a)(2), 50 CALn.. L. Riyv. 89 (1962).
See Advisory Committee's Note. 39 F.R.D. 69. 109-11 (1966).
'-Fm). R. Civ. P. 24(a)(2). Although traditionally the burden of showing that the
requirements or the rule are met is on the intervenor. the addition of the term "unless" in
the 1966 amendment has suggested to some courts that the applicant has only the burden or
showing an interest which may be impaired by the court's holding; the burden or showing
'adequate representation thus shifting to the party opposing intervention. See Nuesse v.
Camp. 385 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Peterson v. United States, 41 F.R.D. 131 (D. Minn.
1966). See generallt 4 J. MOOR. FEDERAL PRACTIC: ' 24.08 (2d ed. 1968).
13386 U.S. 129 (1967).
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basis of his economic interest in a divestiture decree which the
intervenor claimed left his sole supplier of natural gas in a
weakened economic position. 4 Broadly interpreted, El Paso would
seem to open the route of intervention to countless customers and
competitors asserting an economic interest in antitrust litigation.
Nevertheless, the unique circumstances of the El Paso case, and the
court's dicta therein, have led many commentators to the
conclusion that it is not a substantial expansion of rule 24(a)(2)."
In El Paso the Supreme Court may well have permitted
intervention as a means of ultimately bringing the divestiture decree
in line with its earlier mandate. Also, the lengthy dicta on the
defects of the decree indicate that the court obviously felt that the
public interest had not been adequately represented. The view that
El Paso should be limited by these factors is further supported by
the Court's dismissal without opinion of another application to
intervene to challenge an antitrust consent decree. In Lupton
Manujftiuring Co. v. United States,5 the intervenor, asserted an
economic interest comparable to that sh9wn in El Paso, but the
lower court denied intervention on a showing that the Government
had diligently protected the public interest. Therefore, there seems
to be a serious question whether the Supreme Court's ruling in El
Paso was designed to expand the "interest" concept of rule
24(a)(2) to the extent suggested by a literal reading of the opinion
or merely to allow intervention to insure compliance with its prior
decision.
Post-El Paso decisions in the lower federal courts have done
little to define the scope of the "interest" required for intervention.
Several such decisions have found 7 or refused to find " an
,1Id. at 133.
'
~1.g.. Note, Federal Civil Procedure: Intervention oJ Right Granted Private Party in
Government Antitrust Suit Under New Rule 24(a)(2), 1968 DuKE L.J. 117; The
Supreme C'ourt. 1966 Term. 81 HARv. L. REV. 110, 221-25 (1967). See also Kaplan,
Continuing Work o the Civil Conunittee: 1966 Amendments o] the Federal Rules of C ivl

Procedure, 81 Hav. L. REv. 356, 406 (1968) (calling El Paso "questionable procedural
law").
I 388 U.S. 457. dismissing appealtrom United States v. Aluminum Co. or America. 41
F.R.D. 342 (E.D. Mo. 1967).
' E.g.. Atlantis Dev. Corp. v. United States, 379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967) (interest was
claim to ownership); Peterson v. United States, 41 F.R.D. 131 (D. Minn. 1966) (interest was
remainderman's share of trust fund).

" E.g.. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Penrose Indus. Corp., 387 F.2d 939 (3d Cir.). cert.

denied, 392 U.S. 927 (1968) (speculative interest in property is not sufficient under rule
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"interest" based on the "property" concept so frequently used in
pre-amendment cases. A similar pre-amendment concept of
"interest" was used to deny intervention on the grounds that there
was no legal detriment to the intervenor flowing from the
decision.'9 Generally, those decisions which have considered an
"economic" interest similar to that in El Paso have been unwilling
to find a similarly broad right of intervention. In Isbrandtsen Co.
v. S.S. Kokoh Maru,20 a district court held an intervenor must
have a "direct personal or pecuniary interest in the subject of the
litigation" but refused to allow a plaintiff seeking to recover the
purchase price of goods to intervene in an action brought by the
defendant against the carrier for damages to the goods. A broad
reading of El Paso's interest concept was also rejected by the
Third Circuit which refused to allow a prospective purchaser to
intervene in a suit for declaratory judgment to determine the
commercial reasonableness of a proposed sale of pledged collateral
under section 9-507(2) of the Uniform Commercial Code.2' In
United States v. First National Bank & Trust ('. ,'2 a district court
relied on El Paso to allow intervention by a competing bank to
contest a proposed final judgment allowing a merger of rival banks.
However, the court specifically adopted the interpretation of El
Paso advanced by Mr. Justice Stewart's dissent"3-that of allowing
intervention when a volunteer could convince the court that the
Government might have used bad judgment in conducting or
settling the lawsuit. The lone exception to the trend toward
restricting the El Paso holding has been the District of Columbia
Circuit's decision in Nuesse v. Camp." In Nuesse. a state official
directly concerned with effectuating a state banking policy was
allowed to intervene in a federal action involving interpretation of
federal banking regulations which were largely reflective of state
24(a)(2); United States v. Benford. 44 F.R.D. 231 (N.D. Ind. 1968) (real interest is title to

documents and not the alleged interest of possible use of the principal judgment in
subsequent criminal prosecution).
, Edmondson v. State x rel. Meyer. 383 l-.2d
123 (8th Cir. 1967).
263 P. Supp. 784 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Penrose Indus. Corp., 387 F.2d 939 (2d Cir.), cert. denied.

392 U.S. 927 (1968).
280 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Ky. 1967), aJJfd. 391 U.S. 469 (1968).
SCascade Natural Gas Corp. v. El Paso Natural Gas Co.. 386 U.S. 129, 143 (1967)

(Stewart. J..
dissenting).
.l385 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
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banking regulations. The state official's "interest" derived from the
fact that the potential interpretation of federal regulations could be
out of harmony with state regulation interpretation. Such disparity
might put state banks at a disadvantage in competing with national
banks. The Nuesse court broadly defined the interest test as "a
practical guide to disposing of lawsuits by involving as many
apparently concerned persons as is compatible with efficiency and
due process.'"'

More prominent in the post-El Paso decisions than a broad
reading of the "interest" requirement has been a focusing on the
two other tests enunciated by rule 24(a)(2)- "practical impairment
or impediment" and "adequacy of representation." The leading case
on the nature of "practical impairment" is Atlantis Development
Corp. v. United State 5 involving intervention by a person claiming
title to certain reefs in a suit brought by the Government against
other claimants to the reefs. The court recognized that although
judgment in the main action would not be res judicata as to the
proposed intervenor, a favorable judgment for the Government
would likely represent a legal precedent adverse to the intervenor's
claim. Therefore, under new rule 24(a)(2), the potential effect of
stare decisis was found to create the requisite "practical
impairment." The Atlantis rationale was approved and followed in
Nuesse where the court spoke of the revised federal rules being
designed to avoid a "fragmented approach to adjudication."' ' The
traditional concept of inadequacy of representation, the third test of
rule 24(a)(2), was summarized by the court in Peterson v. United
States"8 as representation which involved collusion, an adverse
interest, or a failure to fulfill a duty. However, a recent decision,
United States v. Blue Chip Stamp Co., 2 recognized that inadequate
representation of a proposed intervenor's interest may arise from
the decision of an original party not to appeal an adverse decision.
lId. at 700.
2' 379 F.2d 818 (5th Cir. 1967).
27 385 F.2d 694, 702 (D.C. Cir. 1967). But see Old Colony Trust Co. v. Penrose
Indus. Corp., 387 F.2d 939 (3d Cir.), cert. denied. 392 U.S. 927 (1968) (intervention
denied to one who sought to attack commercial reasonableness or proposed sale which was
the subject of the main litigation).
-41 F.R.D. 131 (D. Minn. 1966).

1272 F. Supp. 432, 437 (C.D. Cal. 1967), aff d sub norm.. Thrifty Shoppers Script Co. v.

United States, 389 U.S. 580 (1968). For a similar pre-amendment ruling, see Wolpe v.
Poretsky. 144 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied. 323 U.S..777 (1944).
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Nuesse also liberalized the scope of adequacy of representation by
holding that the difference between a public interest advanced by a
proposed intervenor and a private interest of the original party
would create an inadequacy 0 Therefore, while most lower federal
courts have been unwilling to expand the "interest" required by
24(a)(2) to the extent suggested by a literal reading of El Paso,
there have been significant advances in expanding the concepts of
"'practical impairment" and "adequate representation."
Although liberally construing the interest requirement, the court
in Smuck v. Hobson denied intervention to the resigned
Superintendent and to the dissenting school board members for
their failure to show an interest. As a named defendant only in his
official capacity, the Superintendent after resigning was without
any personal interest and would not be personally bound by the
outcome of the action -1 Similarly, the dissenting board member,
although retaining his official position, had no personal interest
since he had full opportunity to participate in the school board's
defense and its decision not to appeal, and since he as an individual
could not violate the decree or be subject to enforcement
proceedings. 2 However, the parents' concern for their children's
education was recognized by the court as a legally protected
interest on the basis of cases granting standing to sue founded on
comparable interests.3: The court realized that the question
regarding intervention was not whether the party could bring a suit
but whether he should be allowed to participate in litigation already
in progress. Citing its test in Nuesse, the court reiterated its view of
the interest requirement as a "guide to disposing of lawsuits by
involving as many apparently concerned persons as is compatible
with efficiency and due process. ' '34 Relying on El Paso as
formulating an expansive concept of "interest," the Smuck court
found that under certain circumstances, the parents' concern for
: 385 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1967). See text accompanying note 25 supra.
"408 F.2d at 177. Presumably this rationale would have applied to the former
Superintendent even if he had retained his position due to the decision of the board not to
appeal. But see Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694 (D.C. Cir. 1967).

"408 F.2d at 178. See State ex rel. Erb v. Sweaas, 98 Minn. 17, 107 N.W. 404 (1906);
Elterich v. Arndt, 175 Wash. 562, 27 P.2d 1102 (1933).
408 F.2d at 178-79. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 534-35 (1925).
"408 F.2d at 179, quoting Nuesse v. Camp, 385 F.2d 694,700 (D.C. Cir. 1967).

DUKE LA W JOURNAL

(Vol. 1969: 821

their children's education was sufficient "interest" under the test
advanced by Nuesse. 5.
In determining whether the circumstances justifying intervention
were present, the second and third requirements of "practical
impediments" and "inadequate representation" were found to be
more useful in limiting the extension of intervention than was the
"interest" requirement." Stare decisis would provide the practical
impairment since if not allowed to intervene, the parents had no
way to pursue their interest unless they alleged that the policies
adopted by the board were unconstitutional. But while such policies
might not be constitutionally required, the very discretion for which
the parents were arguing would give the board wide range in
adopting such policies without encountering constitutional
objections.37 Implicit in this rationale is the assumption that
mandamus would not lie to compel school board action; not only
because it is an extraordinary writ, but also because its use is
limited to compelling required acts, not to challenging an act of
discretion. 8 The court tacitly assumed that the parents' interests
were adequately represented by the defendants at trial. However,
the conflict between the interests of the school board representing
all parents in the District and the narrower interest of the proposed
intervenors in their own children could have caused inadequate
representation since considerations such as publicity, cost, and
delay would not have the same inhibiting effect on the parents as it
might have on the school board. Moreover, the court noted that
even an overly restrictive court order might be welcome relief to a
school board buffetted by opposing demands and in search of
another scapegoat. Therefore, the intervenors established a
sufficiently serious possibility that they were inadequately
represented on the decision not to appeal.
Having decided that the parents would be practically
disadvantaged by not permitting an appeal and that their
representation by existing parties was inadequate so that all
requirements for intervention were present, a more thorough
408 F.2d at 179-80.
IId. at 179.
-Id. at 180-81.
="See. e.g.. Panama Canal Co. v. Grace Line, Inc., 356 U.S. 309, 317-18 (1958);
Virginian Ry. v. System Fed'n 40, AFL, 300 U.S. 515, 551 (1937).
31408 F.2d at 181.
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analysis of their "interest" was necessary to determine the scope of
intervention to be granted."' Since their interest was only in
allowing the board the widest discretion possible, the parents were
allowed to intervene only to contest those issues which imposed
actual restraints upon the board." The court viewed the ruling on
the long-range plan of pupil assignment as merely a precatory
reference to the need for the school board to take steps to correct
the racially imbalanced system then existing, and therefore the
order was not seen as operating to curtail board discretion.'Similarly, the order to abolish the "track system" did not limit
board discretion since that ability grouping method had been under
severe attack and the board, even before the ruling, had taken steps
to devise an improved method.5 No intervention was allowed since
these rulings did not affect the parents' interest in maximum board
discretion. Intervention was allowed to contest the rulings relating
to bussing, optional zones and faculty integration because these
orders required the board affirmatively to undertake new activities
and to abolish features which were an accepted part of the school
system." However, on the merits, these three rulings were found to
be constitutionally required to remedy the discriminatory practices
inherent in the board's previous methods.'5 Therefore, the court
refused to modify any part of the order entered by the trial court.A
Smuck v. Hobson is a logical extension of the District of
Columbia Circuit's apparent decision to read broadly the El Paso
interpretation of the "interest" requirement under rule 24(a)(2).
Previously, in .Vuesse. the same court had defined the requisite
interest by balancing the demands of apparently concerned parties
with the need for judicial ejftciency and due process. 7 Smuck
Id. at 182. See generally Shapiro. Some Thoughts on Intervention BeJore Courts.
.4gencies. and Arbitrators.81 HARv. L. REv. 721, 752-56 (1968).
1 408 F.2d at 182.
12 Id. at

186.
at 187-90. For an extended discussion on the criticism of the District of Columbia's
"track system," see Hobson v. Hansen, 269 F. Supp. 401,442-92 (D.D.C. 1967).
SId.

" 408 l-.2d at 183-85.
is

hit.

11I. at 190. Since a new school board had been elected subsequent to the rulings in the

trial court, the case was remanded to the lower court, instead of a simple affirmance, in
order to insure that the new school board was given wide latitude in the development of new

programs and orders pertaining to the school system.
, See note 25 supra.
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represents an excellent example of the application of the Nuesse
rule. The parents had an appropriate concern for their children's
welfare which could be affected by a decision limiting the board's
discretion. Furthermore, overall efficiency would be improved since
the contribution of the additional parties on appeal would be
limited to briefs and oral arguments as opposed to a possibly
drawn out trial court action on many of the same issues if the
parents were forced to bring a separate lawsuit. Moreover, the
actual interest found in Smuck is analogous to that present in
Nuesse. In Nuesse, a state official directly concerned with
effectuating state policy had an "interest" in a controversy
concerning the nature and protection of that policy 8 whereas in
Smuck, parents directly concerned with protecting their children's
welfare had an "interest" in a controversy cqncerning the
protection of a policy directly related to their children's welfare.8
Going beyond the "economic" interest of El Paso, Smtuck joins
Nuesse in finding the requisite 24(a)(2) "interest" where
adjudication between primary litigants will necessarily involve the
interpretation of a policy which directly affects the intervenor's
particular area of concern.
Intervention which is based upon the intervenor's interest in
seeing that the court favorably determines certain facts and legal
questions would seem, however, to fall within the scope of rule
24(b) which provides for intervention in the discretion of the trial
court when "an applicant's claim or defense and the main action
have a question of law or fact in common."511 The liberal
interpretation of 24(a)(2) therefore represents an encroachment
upon the scope of rule 24(b), perhaps manifesting judicial disfavor
with the practice of only allowing appeal from a denial of
permissive intervention upon a final judgment"l and of limiting the
scope of review on appeal to the question of abuse of discretion"
See text accompanying note 25 supra.
"408 F.2d at 180.
FE. R. Civ. P. 24(b).

"tSee. e.g., City of New York v. Consolidated Gas Co., 253 U.S. 219 (1920); Burrow v.
Citizens' State Bank, 74 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1935). But see Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen v.
Baltimore &-O.R.R.. 331 U.S. 519, 524-25 (1947). See generally Shapiro, supra note 40. at
748-51.
:"See. e.g.. Cameron v. President and Fellows of Harvard College, 157 F.2d 993, 997 (Ist
Cir. 1946); Wolpe v. Poretsky, 144 F.2d 505, 508 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied. 320 U.S. 777

(1944).
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Thus, Smuck, Nuesse and El Paso may presage a decreased use of
permissive intervention with its attendant hardships. However,
given the expanded scope of rule 24(a), Smuck may have its
greatest value as a guide for easier judicial determination of when
to allow intervention as of right. By broadening the scope of
"interest" and viewing it as a minimum prerequisite rather than a
determinative criterion,-:- courts no longer are confronted with
having to decide a request for intervention primarily on the basis
of the nebulous concept of "interest.":' Instead, the major factors
in allowing intervention become practical impairment and adequacy
of representation, the meanings of which are perhaps more readily
apparent. Since the purpose of intervention is to decide when
existing litigation should be opened to additional parties, 5 practical
matters such as possible harm and adequate representation would
seem better suited to such a purpose rather than a technical
analysis of the proposed intervenor's "interest." Indeed, the 1966
amendments were passed in order to end such a technical
interpretation of "'bound by a judgment" and "inadequate
representation. " -" As Snnuck notes, post-amendment courts should
not be lead astray by a similar "myopic fixation" on the nature of
an "'interest."'5 7 However, "interest" is not read out of rule
24(a)(2) by Smuck. 5 Instead of being the prime determinant in
granting intervention, the minimum "interest," previously found,
will be analyzed again to determine the scope of intervention. Such
treatment would seem in accord with the Nuesse definition of
interest since in determining the scope, the court would seek to
allow intervention on as many related issues as compatible with
efficient court operation. Unfortunately, the District of Columbia
Circuit stands alone in its attempt to grant intervention in accord
with the pragmatic considerations behind rule 24(a)(2) rather than
on the abstract or technical character of "interest."

408 F.2d at 179-80.

For an example of an attempt to classify "interests" see Shapiro, supra note 40, at 72940. Professor Shapiro concludes that the "'range of possible interests tnay defy adequate
classification, spreading over a spectrum that is extremely hard to chart." Id. at 740.
M408 F.2d at 179.
'

See Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69. 110 (1966).

408 F.2d at 179.

Iid. at 179-80.

